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 Since the September 11 attacks on the United States, there have 
been numerous articles about President Bush’s alleged expansion of 
executive authority – be it the warrantless surveillance of US citizens, 
detainment of enemy combatants, or signing statements on prisoner 
torture.1 However, an opinion issued by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit introduced a fascinating method of 
executive authority curtailment. In Freedom from Religion 
Foundation, Inc. v. Chao, the Seventh Circuit expanded the doctrine of 
“taxpayer standing” to apply to executive branch actions funded by 
general congressional appropriations.2 At first glance, the Seventh 
Circuit simply seems to be establishing a check on the executive and 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, December 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois 
Institute of Technology; B.S. Chemical Engineering, May 1999, University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I would like to acknowledge Professor Hal Morris, 
Julia Lissner, and Mark Diomede for their invaluable help in writing this article. 
1 Spencer S. Hsu, Bush Balks at Criteria for FEMA Director; Signing 
Statement Asserts Right to Ignore Parts of New Homeland Security Law, The 
Washington Post, October 7, 2006 Saturday, Final Edition at A02 
2 See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 
2006), rehearing, en banc, denied by Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 
447 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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granting power to the taxpaying public with this ruling.3 However, a 
closer analysis of this case reveals the decision to be a double-edged 
sword, since the case also grants power to the federal courts – leading 
to potentially unaccountable, undemocratic results. With Freedom 
from Religion v. Chao, the gate has been opened for taxpayers to bring 
lawsuits challenging virtually any executive action.4 These challenges 
can effectively provide “judicial vetoes” of executive actions which 
might not easily be remedied by the democratic process. The judicial 
branch is now in a position of authority over the acts of the other 
branches of government.5 Furthermore, by disregarding Supreme 
Court precedent regarding the narrowness of taxpayer standing, the 
Seventh Circuit added additional confusion to the maze of taxpayer 
standing doctrine.6  
This Note is divided into four Sections. Section I of this Note 
briefly describes taxpayer standing and its history in the courts. 
Section II discusses the Seventh Circuit decision in Freedom from 
Religion. Section III analyzes that decision in light of precedent, 
reasoning, and public policy. Finally, Section IV concludes that the 
decision was incorrectly decided. 
 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICAN TAXPAYER-STANDING DOCTRINE  
 
Based on Supreme Court interpretation of Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution, standing is required to invoke the power of a federal 
court.7 The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” has three 
                                                 
3 433 F.3d at 996-97. 
4 Id. at 1000 (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
5 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488-489 (1923) 
6 Frank I. Michaelman, Popular Law and the Doubtful Case Rule, 81 Chi.-
Kent. L. Rev. 1109 (2006) (“[W]hen the political branches of the Government act 
against the background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, 
it must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its 
precedents with the respect due them under settled principles.”) 
7 US CONST. art. III, §2; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 
(1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 
498 (1975). 
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parts: (1) the plaintiff must allege an actual or imminent "injury in 
fact”; (2) there must be some causal connection between the injury and 
the conduct complained of; (3) the plaintiff must demonstrate that a 
favorable decision would likely redress that injury.8 Standing also 
consists of “prudential” principles, which deny standing to a plaintiff 
who has been injured as a result of the defendant's conduct but who is 
not the proper person to bring suit.9 
The concept of standing as a limitation on judicial jurisdiction has 
had a tortured history in the Supreme Court.10 “Standing frequently 
has been identified by both justices and commentators as one of the 
most confused areas of the law,” 11 although it is generally agreed that 
standing is one of the most important doctrines regarding judicial 
power.12  
 
A. Supreme Court Precedent Regarding Taxpayer Standing 
 
The taxpayer standing doctrine is “the principle that a taxpayer 
has no standing to sue the government for allegedly misspending the 
public’s tax money unless the taxpayer can demonstrate a personal 
stake and show some direct injury.”13 The taxpayer doctrine was 
established since the conduct of the federal government was found to 
                                                 
8 Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000); United States v. Hays, 515 
U.S. 737, 742-743 (1995); Ne. Fla. Contractors v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-
664 (1993); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
9 Freedom from Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 990. 
10 See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, 
“Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 168 (1992) (noting that from 
1965-1994, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of standing on 109 occasions) 
11ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 60 
(2d ed. 2002). 
12 United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 
737, 750 (1984) (“The Art. III doctrine that requires a litigant to have "standing" to 
invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most important of these 
doctrines.”). 
13 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 696 (2d pocket ed. 2001). 
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be too far removed from individual taxpayer returns for any injury to 
the taxpayer to be traced to the use of tax revenues.14  
The Supreme Court laid out the boundaries on taxpayer standing 
in a series of cases which commentators divide into “eras.”15 Professor 
Chemerinsky divides these cases into four eras: 1) initial cases 
preventing taxpayer standing; 2) the Warren Court’s expansion of 
taxpayer standing; 3) the Burger Court’s virtual elimination of 
taxpayer standing; and 4) the Rehnquist Court’s decisions.16 
In the early 1920s, Frothingham v. Mellon17 established that “the 
basic rule is that taxpayers do not have standing to challenge how the 
federal government spends tax revenue.”18 In Frothingham, the Court 
dismissed a taxpayer suit challenging federal expenditures under the 
Maternity Act.19 In that unanimous opinion, Justice Sutherland 
emphasized the basic function of limiting judicial review of 
congressional acts: 
 
The functions of government under our system are 
apportioned. To the legislative department has been 
committed the duty of making laws; to the executive 
the duty of executing them; and to the judiciary the 
duty of interpreting and applying them in cases 
properly brought before the courts. The general rule is 
that neither department may invade the province of the 
other and neither may control, direct or restrain the 
action of the other . . . Looking through forms of words 
                                                 
14 Freedom from Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 990. 
15 See supra note 10, at 168-97 (Professor Sunstein divides American standing 
history into five distinct eras.); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 90 (Professor Chemerinksy divides American 
standing into four sets). 
16 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 90 
(2d ed. 2002). 
17 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
18In re U.S. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1989). 
19 262 U.S. 447, 487-88. 
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to the substance of their complaint, it is merely that 
officials of the executive department of the government 
are executing and will execute an act of Congress 
asserted to be unconstitutional; and this we are asked to 
prevent. To do so would be not to decide a judicial 
controversy, but to assume a position of authority over 
the governmental acts of another and co-equal 
department, an authority which plainly we do not 
possess.20 
 
As such, taxpayer standing to challenge expenditures in general 
was denied in Frothingham v. Mellon because the impact of spending 
upon the taxpayer was deemed too tenuous, and impeded upon 
separation of powers principles.21 
Up to 1952, the Supreme Court was consistently applying the 
taxpayer standing doctrine, as in Doremus v. Board v. Education22. In 
that case, the Court applied the Frothingham taxpayer-standing 
doctrine and dismissed the case for lack of standing when plaintiffs 
brought suit claiming a violation of the Establishment Clause through 
a New Jersey law which allowed public school teachers to read Bible 
passage in the classroom.23 The Court held that the injury to the 
taxpayer was too remote from the federal treasury and too 
indeterminable to be a real injury.24 The Court concluded that Article 
III’s requirements were therefore insufficiently satisfied and federal 
courts lacked jurisdiction.25 
                                                 
20 Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Melon, 262 U.S. 447, 489 (U.S. 1923) 
(emphasize added). 
21 Id. at 489 
22 342 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1952) 
23 Id. at 430. 
24 Id. at 434. 
25 Id. at 434-35. 
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 A major change occurred in the late 1960s when the Warren 
Court created an exception to the concept of taxpayer standing.26 In 
Flast v. Cohen, the Court overturned a lower court’s application of 
Frothingham when it created an exception stating that “a taxpayer will 
have standing consistent with Article III to invoke federal judicial 
power when he alleges that congressional action under the taxing and 
spending clause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions 
which operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending 
power.”27 In Flast, taxpayers tried to stop the expenditures under the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.28 Chief Justice 
Warren held that taxpayer standing depends on “whether there is a 
logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be 
adjudicated.”29 The Court explicitly distinguished Flast (involving an 
Establishment Clause violation through Congress’s tax and spending 
power) against Frothingham (dealing with Tenth Amendment violation 
by Congress not on tax and spending power).30 The Flast Court 
justified the exception stating that "the specific evils feared by [its 
drafters] that the taxing and spending power would be used to favor 
one religion over another or to support religion in general."31  
In introducing the Flast exception, the Court developed a two 
prong test to determine whether the plaintiffs as taxpayers had 
standing to sue: (1) the taxpayer must “allege the unconstitutionality 
only of exercises of congressional power under the taxing and 
spending clause” and (2) the taxpayer must show that the challenged 
                                                 
26 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968) (“We find no absolute bar in Article 
III to suits by federal taxpayers challenging allegedly unconstitutional federal taxing 
and spending programs.”) 
27 Id. at 106. 
28 Id. at 85. 
29 Id. at 102.  
30 Id. at 85. 
31 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1865 (U.S. 2006) 
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enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations upon the exercise 
of the taxing and spending power.32 
 In 1970s and 80s, under the Burger Court, the narrowness of 
the taxpayer standing exception introduced in Flast was revealed. In 
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War and United States 
v. Richardson, the Court denied standing because the taxpayer 
plaintiffs did not challenge a congressional enactment under the 
Taxing and Spending Clause, but rather an action of the Executive 
Branch.33 Another ruling emphasizing the narrowness of Flast 
occurred in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State.34 In that case, the Court dismissed a 
taxpayer suit attempting to challenge a federal grant of property to the 
Valley Forge Christian College.35 The Court distinguished Valley 
Forge from Flast by stating that the allegedly unconstitutional action 
in Valley Forge was an executive action, not a congressional statute as 
it was in Flast.36 Consequently, “[a]fter Richardson, Schlesinger, and 
Valley Forge the only situation in which taxpayer standing appears 
permissible is if the plaintiff challenges a government expenditure as 
violating the Establishment Clause.”37 
                                                 
32 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of 
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 478-79 (1982) (emphasis added). 
33 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 228 (1974); 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); D.C. Common Cause v. District 
of Columbia, 858 F.2d 1, 3-4 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“The Court has never recognized 
federal taxpayer standing outside these narrow facts, and it has refused to 
extend Flast to exercises of executive power.”) 
34 454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
35 Id. at 486-87. 
36 The Court in Valley Forge held the taxpayers failed the Flast test in two 
respects: (1) the source of their complaint was not a congressional action - Flast 
limited taxpayer standing to challenges directed "only [at] exercises of congressional 
power” and (2) the property transfer was not an exercise of authority conferred by 
the Taxing and Spending Clause of Art. I, § 8. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 479-80. 
37 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 93 
(2d ed. 2002). 
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Subsequently, under Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Court 
reaffirmed Flast in Bowen v. Kendrick, permitting a taxpayer challenge 
to a federal grant program that funded teen pregnancy prevention 
through religious organizations38  
In 2006, in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, the Court rejecting 
granting standing to taxpayers for allegedly unconstitutional 
congressional actions under the Commerce.39 Consequently, if 
previous Supreme Court rejections to expanding the narrow Flast 
exception were not explicit, DaimlerChrylser reinforced the idea that 
the Supreme Court was never comfortable with the Flast exception in 
the first place and wanted to keep it narrow.40  
 
B. Other Court Interpretations of Supreme Court Precedent 
 
The narrowness of the Flast and Bowen, when applied to taxpayer 
standing, has been noted by sister Court of Appeals and some 
commentators. Notably, one commentator stated, "Fate has not been 
kind to the Flast decision. In the field of taxpayer standing, it has been 
limited to very narrow confines."41  
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
reconciled Supreme Court precedent involving taxpayer standing by 
emphasizing the narrowness of the cases, “Schlesinger, Valley Forge, 
and similar cases must be understood as limiting the Flast exception to 
the Court's general rule against federal taxpayer standing.”42 
In In re Catholic Conference, the Second Circuit had the 
opportunity to address an application of Flast to executive action. In re 
Catholic Conference involved a pro-abortion group bringing suit 
against the U.S. Government because the Internal Revenue Service 
                                                 
38 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). 
39 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1865 (U.S. 2006). 
40 Id. 
41 Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 649 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing 13 C. 
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531.1 (2d ed. 
1984)). 
42 D.C. Common Cause v. District of Columbia, 858 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
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granted tax-exempt status to the Catholic Church.43 The plaintiffs 
alleged that the Catholic Church, through its campaigning against 
abortion, violated the IRS’s prohibition on lobbying and campaigning 
for tax-exempt entities.44 Citing Supreme Court precedent, the Second 
Circuit distinguished In re Catholic Conference with the Flast and 
Bowen opinions by noting that the plaintiff’s complaint centered on an 
alleged executive branch action.45 Thus, the Second Circuit made clear 
the narrowness of Flast’s exception to Frothingham’s rule against 
taxpayer standing.”46 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also emphasized the 
narrowness of Flast and Bowen in its ruling denying standing in Rocks 
v. City of Philadelphia.47 The court noted that Flast and Bowen serve 
as precedential authority only if establishment and free exercise 
clauses and congressional taxing and spending power are involved.48 
 
II.  THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH IN  
FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION V. CHAO  
 
A.  The Majority Decision in the Three Judge Panel 
 
In Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Chao, the party claiming 
taxpayer standing was the Wisconsin-based Freedom from Religion 
Foundation, a non-profit tax exempt national association of nontheists 
that had been “working since 1978 to promote free thought and defend 
                                                 
43 885 F.2d 1020, 1028 (2d Cir. 1989). 
44 Id. at 1022. 
45 Id. at 1028. 
46 See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227-28 
(1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175-176 (1974). 
47 Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 649 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Flast and 
Bowen are extremely limited holdings. They hold that federal taxpayers have 
standing to raise establishment clause claims against exercises of congressional 
power under the taxing and spending power of article I, section 8 of the 
constitution.”). 
48 Id. at 649. 
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the constitutional principle of the separation of state and church.”49 
The target of the Freedom from Religion Foundation’s challenge was 
President Bush’s establishment of the White House Office of Faith-
Based and Community Initiatives by an executive order.50 In holding 
for Freedom from Religion Foundation on partial summary judgment, 
Judge John C. Shabaz for the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Wisconsin noted that the government51 had raised concerns 
over jurisdictional and prudential mootness and ripeness.52 However, 
Judge Shabaz dismissed these concerns stating that the “[d]efendants 
must bear the heavy burden to prove that there [was] no reasonable 
expectation that the wrong [would] be repeated.”53 Judge Shabaz then 
concluded that the defendants failed to meet the burden.”54 
On appeal, the government raised issues concerning standing to 
the Seventh Circuit. 55 In finding for the plaintiffs, Judge Posner wrote 
the majority opinion for the divided panel56, beginning with a 
statement of the issue as “whether a taxpayer can ever have standing 
under Article III of the Constitution to litigate an alleged violation of 
the First Amendment’s establishment clause unless Congress has 
earmarked money for the program or activity that is challenged.”57 
Judge Posner said that District Judge Shabaz’s opinion would have 
                                                 
49Freedom from Religion Foundation Homepage, http://ffrf.org, (last visited 
Dec. 6, 2006). 
50 See Exec. Order No. 13199 (2001); Exec. Order No. 13198 (2001); Exec. 
Order No. 13342 (2004); Exec. Order No. 13280 (2002); Exec. Order 13279 (2002).  
51 Jim Towey, Patrick Purtill, Brent Orrell, Bobby Polito, Ryan Streeter, John 
Porter, Juliete McCarthy, Linda Shovlain, David Caprara, Elaine Chao, Tommy 
Thomspon, Rod Paige, John Ashcroft, and Dr. Julie Gerberding 
52 Freedom from Religion v. Chao, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39444, 28 (W.D. 
Wis. Jan. 11, 2006). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Freedom from Religion Found. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989. For a recent outline 
of this case, see 119 HARV. L. REV. 2260. 
56 The divided panel included Judge Posner and Judge Wood in the majority, 
with Judge Ripple dissenting. 
57 Freedom from Religion Found. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 990 (7th Cir. 2006) 
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been correct under an “earlier view.”58 He then discussed the cases that 
developed taxpayer standing doctrine in United States jurisprudence.59 
Judge Posner noted that Justice Frankfurter’s reading of the Article III 
flatly rejected taxpayer standing.60 Frankfurter suggested that the 
Framers of the Constitution did not envision individual taxpayers 
filing lawsuits against the federal government due to the attenuated 
relationship between the taxpayers and federal government at the 
time.61 Judge Posner noted that standing principles developed by the 
Supreme Court was divided into two types: prudential and 
constitutional.62 Although Judge Posner was talking about principles 
created by Supreme Court precedent, he said that the prudential 
principles of standing were “protean and mutable.”63 Judge Posner 
explained that the term “prudential” was “the very antithesis of a 
definite rule or standard.”64 Moreover, the majority interpreted Flast as 
requiring a two prong test for challenges under Article I’s tax and 
spending clause including: 1) not an incidental expenditure of tax 
funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute and 2) 
the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations 
imposed on the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending 
power that is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by 
Article I, §8. 65 
Since the previous Flast and Bowen rulings dealt with statutes 
involving specified congressional funds, the majority had to noted that 
this case involved no specific statutory program involved in this 
case.66 Despite that, the court held that “the difference [between a 
                                                 
58 Id. 
59 Similar to Section II of this paper, Judge Posner went into Frothingham, 
Doremus, Flast, and Bowen. Freedom from Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 990. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 991. 
63 Id. at 992. 
64 Id.  
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 994 
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specific statutory program and a general program] [could not] be 
controlling.”67 
Judge Posner set forth some interesting hypotheticals on the when 
taxpayer standing would not be necessary but could be used: “Suppose 
Homeland Security built a mosque to reduce the likelihood of 
terrorism, taxpayer standing would not be essential to challenge the 
violation of the Establishment Clause.”68  
Because of the present case’s similarity with the facts in Flast, 
Judge Posner noted that “the Court in Flast carved an exception for an 
incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an 
essentially regulatory state.”69 However, Judge Posner then said that 
he was going to put to one side the term “regulatory.”70 He then 
focused on the term “incidental” and called that term relative.71 He 
never returned to the word “regulatory” that was in the controlling 
Flast precedent.72 
Judge Posner even performed a law and economics analysis with 
taxpayer standing and the Establishment Clause:  
 
Imagine a suit complaining that the President was 
violating the [Establishment] Clause by including 
favorable references to religion in his State of the 
Union address. The objection to his action would not be 
to any expenditure of funds for a religious purpose; and 
though an accountant could doubtless estimate the cost 
to the government of the preparations, security 
arrangements, etc., involved in a State of the Union 
address, that cost would be no greater merely because 
the President had mentioned Moses rather than John 
Stuart Mill. In other words, the marginal or incremental 
                                                 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
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cost to the taxpaying public of the alleged violation of 
the Establishment clause would be zero.73 
 
In the end, the Seventh Circuit ruled in a three judge panel that 
“[t]axpayers have standing to challenge grants by a federal agency to 
religious institutions pursuant to statutes that authorize grants to public 
and private institutions for services, even though the grants have not 
been made by Congress itself.”74  
In this expansion of established taxpayer-standing doctrine, the 
majority held that it should not matter whether the program was 
executive or congressional, or whether a program was funded through 
general appropriations rather than earmarked appropriations.75 As 
such, the majority expanded taxpayer standing doctrine on two fronts: 
permitting taxpayer standing when the program at issue is created by 
the executive branch, rather than just those created by the legislative 
branch, and permitting taxpayer standing when the program is funded 
with general appropriations, rather than just specific congressional 
grants.  
 
B.  The Ripple Dissent in the Three Judge Panel 
 
In a forceful dissent, Judge Ripple noted that although there might 
be an initial appeal towards limiting executive power by using federal 
judiciary power, the majority’s approach simply cuts the concept of 
taxpayer standing “loose from its moorings.”76  Judge Ripple 
explained how the majority opinion was a dramatic expansion of 
standing doctrine that did not follow Supreme Court precedent.77 He 
explained that the modern doctrine of standing was “hard-born” and 
“well-established” and “important” in the Nation’s jurisprudence.78 He 
                                                 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 997. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 998 (Ripple, J. dissenting). 
77 Id. at 997. 
78 Id. 
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scolded the majority stating, “We cannot ignore or treat as malleable 
what the Supreme Court has mandated.”79 The disagreement is not 
about the Tax and Spending Clause, but rather the constitutional 
provision.80 He said that previous rulings apropos standing were “not 
simply prudential matters of judicial restraint but constitutional 
requirements” and required that the plaintiff show that he personally 
suffered actual or threatened injury due to the action of the defendant 
and that it would be favorably decided.81 A showing of concrete injury 
is an “irreducible constitutional minimum.”82 There must be a nexus 
between the taxpayer and the constitutional infringement alleged.83 A 
mere disagreement with the government policy is hardly a case or 
controversy.84  
Judge Ripple said that the majority’s expansive standard made 
virtually any executive action subject to taxpayer suit.85 Federal courts 
could now intrude on the decision-making prerogatives of the 
executive branch.86 The judiciary would effectively be managing the 
executive.87 He described the majority’s approach as inching toward 
the concept of citizen standing, which has been strictly forbidden by 
Supreme Court precedent.88 
Finally, Judge Ripple cited sister court cases such as District of 
Columbia common Cause v. District of Columbia89 and In re United 
States Catholic Conference.90 He said that the Seventh Circuit “ought 
                                                 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 998. 
81 Id. at 997. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 1000. 
84 Id. at 998. 
85 Id. at 1000. 
86 Id. at 996. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1000. 
89 858 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  
90 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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to follow the same course and, in the process, adhere to the principles 
set forth in the Supreme Court’s case law.”91 
 
C. The Denial of En Banc Rehearing 
 
After the three judge panel reversed the lower court’s ruling, the 
government petitioned the Seventh Circuit for a rehearing en banc.92 
In a fascinating ruling, Chief Judge Flaum and Judge Easterbrook, in 
separate concurring opinions, agreed with a new dissenting opinion 
written by Judge Ripple that the Supreme Court needed to resolve the 
controversy.93 
Chief Judge Flaum also wrote a concurring opinion denying 
rehearing en banc but stated “the position set forth in the dissent is one 
which could eventually command high court endorsement.”94 And that 
“the needed consideration of this important issue by that tribunal 
would be unnecessarily delayed by our further deliberation.”95 
Judge Easterbrook hinted at a disagreement with Judge Posner 
throughout his opinion. He began his concurring opinion for denial of 
rehearing en banc by stating that his vote “[did] not imply that [he] 
deem[ed] the panel’s resolution beyond dispute or the issue 
unimportant.96 To the contrary, the subject is both recurring and 
difficult, and there is considerable force in Judge Ripple’s dissent, and 
in the standing analysis of Judge Sykes dissent from Laskowski v. 
Spellings, which extends this panel’s holding.”97 Even though both 
Judge Flaum and Judge Easterbrook noted the tension between 
Supreme Court precedent and Judge Posner’s decision, they still voted 
                                                 
91 Freedom from Religion Found., 433 F.3d at 1001. 
92 Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 447 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 2006)  
93 Id. at 988-89 (Flaum, C.J., Easterbrook, J. concurring, with Ripple, J. 
dissenting). 
94 Id. at 988 (Flaum, C.J. concurring). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 989 (Easterbrook, J. concurring). 
97 Id. 
15
Chamcharas: Who’s the Boss? Seventh Circuit Limits Executive Branch
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006




to deny rehearing en banc, thereby letting Judge Posner’s decision 
stand. 98  
Judge Easterbrook criticized the Supreme Court decisions as 
arbitrary.99 He stated that “comprehensiveness and rationality are not 
[the taxpayer standing] doctrine’s hallmarks.”100 Judge Easterbrook 
stated that “Nothing we can do would eliminate the tensions between 
Flast and Bowen v. Kendrick, on the one hand, and Frothingham and 
Valley Forge (plus the many cases such as Defenders of Wildlife) on 
the other.”101 
In an interesting hypothetical application of the Seventh Circuit 
decision, Judge Easterbrook noted how the Supreme Court ruled in a 
prominent case that an atheist father had no standing to challenge the 
words “under God” in the pledge of allegiance.102 He then suggested 
that, according to the Seventh Circuit ruling, the atheist father might 
be able to overcome that hurdle.103  
In concluding his denial for rehearing en banc, Judge Easterbrook 
stated:  
 
The problem is not of our creation and cannot be 
resolved locally. There is no logical way to determine 
the extent of an arbitrary rule. Only the rule's 
proprietors can bring harmony -- whether by extension 
or contraction -- or decide to tolerate the existing state 
of affairs.104 
 
In the denial of rehearing en banc, both Judge Flaum and Judge 
Easterbrook decided not to wade into the matter of taxpayer standing 
and noted that the Seventh Circuit was not the right forum to discuss 
                                                 
98 Id. at 988. 
99 Id. at 989. 
100 Id. 
101Id. at 990 (Easterbrook, J. concurring). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. (citations omitted). 
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this matter.105 Instead Judge Flaum simply called both Judge Ripple 
and Judge Posner’s opinions “scholarly” and said that the Seventh 
Circuit was not able to resolve this issue.106 
 
D. The Dissent in the Denial for En banc Rehearing 
 
The denial of rehearing en banc drew another vigorous dissenting 
opinion from Judge Ripple, which was joined by Judges Manion, 
Kanne, and Sykes.107 The dissenting opinion by Judge Ripple again 
stated that the majority’s holding drastically expands the Supreme 
Court 1988 ruling in Bowen v. Kendrick, permitting “virtually any 
executive action to be subject to taxpayer suit.”108 The dissent 
compared Bowen, which granted taxpayers standing to challenge a 
specific congressional appropriation to pay a religious institution to 
help adolescent sexual problems with the present case, which involves 
an executive order which uses general appropriations.109 Highlighting 
the circuit split, the dissent cited the Second Circuit case of In re 
United States Catholic Conference (which denied pro-choice 
supporters standing to challenge the Catholic Church’s tax-free status) 
as an example of the appropriate method of applying the two part test 
developed in Flast v. Cohen. 110 
Instead of accepting the rationale of Judge Easterbrook, Judge 
Ripple stated his belief that: 
 
[T]his case also reflects a view about the nature of 
Article III judicial power, the case has serious 
implications for judicial governance, and we, as 
officers of that branch, have a special duty to ensure 
that a decision expanding the authority that we claim 
                                                 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 998 (Easterbrook, J. concurring). 
107 Id. at 990. 
108 Id. at 990 (Ripple, J. dissenting). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 991. 
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for ourselves represents the considered judgment of 
every judge on this court. Such a review is especially 
appropriate when the Government specifically charges, 
as it has here, that the court has "greatly exceeded its 
authority by ignoring the Supreme Court's own rules . . 
. and substituting its own views of what the law 
rationally ought to be.111 
 
Judge Ripple also stated that the Seventh Circuit "decided an 
important federal question in a way that conflicts with the relevant 
decisions" of the Supreme Court and has "entered a decision in 
conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on 
the same important matter."112 Judge Ripple cited the requirements for 
certiorari and applied those requirements to the case; he concluded that 
the Supreme Court should accept certiorari.113 
At the conclusion of his dissent, Judge Ripple reached a similar 
conclusion as Judge Flaum and Judge Easterbrook - that the Supreme 
Court needed to resolve the tensions created by this case.114 He ended 
his opinion by stating “the Government therefore has one last forum in 
which to seek a return to traditional principles governing the right of a 




A.  Following Precedent 
 
Examining the three judge panel and the denial of rehearing en 
banc, there were five opinions written by four judges from the Seventh 
                                                 
111 Id. at 990. 
112 Id. at 991. 
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Circuit.116 Only the majority opinions which expanded taxpayer 
standing bemoaned the “tension which has evolved in this area of 
jurisprudence.”117 Although dissenting Judge Ripple also requested 
that the Supreme Court resolve the issues raised by the case, his 
opinion demonstrated how a narrow and faithful application of 
Supreme Court precedent would avoid the necessity of such another 
sweeping assessment of taxpayer standing doctrine by the Supreme 
Court.118 The Courts of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the District 
of Columbia similarly did not mention any difficulties in applying 
Supreme Court precedent to comparable cases.119 One reason that 
Judge Ripple found no need to mention the arbitrariness and tension 
was because his opinion was properly following Supreme Court 
precedent.120 
In this case, the Freedom from Religion Foundation has not 
suffered any concrete and particularized injury, but rather is seeking 
"to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized 
grievances about the conduct of government.”121 Both Frothingham 
and Flast, supra, reject that basis for standing as incompatible with 
Article III.122  
 Regardless of the wisdom of permitting taxpayer standing or 
not in various situations, the Seventh Circuit is bound to follow the 
                                                 
116 Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 447 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 2006), 
contained Judge Flaum, Judge Easterbrook, and Judge Flaum’s opinions; Freedom 
from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2006), contained Judge 
Posner and Judge Ripple’s opinions. 
 
 
117 Freedom from Religion Found., 447 F.3d 988. 
118 Id. 
119 See generally D.C. Common Cause v. District of Columbia, 858 F.2d 1, 4 
(D.C. Cir. 1988) and In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1028 
(2d Cir. 1989). 
120 See Freedom from Religion Found., 447 F.3d at 997-1001 (Ripple, J. 
dissenting). 
121 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968). 
122 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974). 
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Supreme Court precedent. Flast was established as a narrow exception 
to the doctrine barring taxpayer standing.123 Exceptions should be 
construed narrowly. Now the exception is threatening to swallow the 
entire doctrine of taxpayer standing in the method that Judge Posner 
applied.124 
 
B. Contrary to guiding principles 
 
The standing doctrine serves four values: 1) enforcing separation 
of powers principles by restricting the availability of judicial review; 
2) serves judicial efficiency by preventing a flood of lawsuits; 3) 
improves judicial decision by ensuring there is a specific controversy 
and an advocate with sufficient personal concern to effectively litigate 
a matter; and 4) ensuring judicial fairness in that people raise only 
their own rights and concerns.125 The Seventh Circuit’s expansion of 
the taxpayer standing doctrine in Freedom from Religion v. Chao 
forces an examination of the purposes of having standing doctrine in 
the first place.126 
 First, the standing doctrine serves as an essential element to 
the separations of power doctrine.127 The Seventh Circuit’s expansion 
of taxpayer standing doctrine has shifted the allocation of power 
between the branches of government. The court is effectively inching 
towards a judicial veto on executive programs, enabling the courts, "to 
assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another 
and co-equal department," and to become "'virtually continuing 
                                                 
123 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988) (“Although we have 
considered the problem of standing and Article III limitations on federal jurisdiction 
many times since [Flast], we have consistently adhered to Flast and the narrow 
exception it created to the general rule against taxpayer standing”). 
124 Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 997 (Ripple, J. 
dissenting). 
125 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
60-62 (2d ed. 2002). 
126 Freedom from Religion Found., 433 F.3d 997. 
127 See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of 
the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881 (1983). 
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monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.”128 When 
a court interferes with a legislative act or the action of an elected 
executive, it thwarts the will or representatives of the actual people.129 
Or as Professor Sunstein points out, judges are removed from political 
accountability and selected from a highly educated elite.130 Once a 
“constitutionalized” decision is issued by a federal court, as occurred 
in the disastrous Dredd Scott decision, very few democratic remedies 
remain.131 
Justice Powell also saw the expansion of standing as a 
threat to the proper functioning of the system of checks and 
balances, as well as to democratic principles of government:  
 
Relaxation of standing requirements is directly related 
to the expansion of judicial power. It seems to me 
inescapable that allowing unrestricted taxpayer or 
citizen standing would significantly alter the allocation 
of power at the national level, with a shift away from a 
democratic form of government.132 
 
Second, the standing doctrine serves an important function in 
improving judicial efficiency by restricting a flood of lawsuits.133 The 
Seventh Circuit decision expanded the doctrine of taxpayer standing to 
include executive actions and general appropriations, thereby 
expanding the avenues in which plaintiffs can bring suit.134 Plaintiffs 
                                                 
128 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (citations omitted). 
129 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-17 (2d ed. 1986) 
(describing “The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty” in judicial review of actions taken 
by other branches of government). 
130 See supra note 10, at 216. 
131 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
132United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974). 
133 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
60-62 (2d ed. 2002). 
134 Freedom from Religion Found. v. Chao, F. 433 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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now need only frame their complaints in methods that comport with a 
violation of the Establishment Clause.135 
Third, the taxpayer standing doctrine serves to improve judicial 
decisions so that the judiciary only decides specific cases with 
particularized remedies.136 In this case, the Seventh Circuit is 
permitting plaintiffs with no concrete or particularized injury to bring 
suit against the executive branch.137 The harm alleged by Freedom 
from Religion Foundation is the executive branch’s general use of tax 
revenue.138 As a result, due to the unparticularized and unspecific 
claim of the plaintiffs, the only remedy possible by the judicial branch 
would be, in essence, a judicial veto.  
 Fourth, the taxpayer standing doctrine serves to ensuring fairness 
so that taxpayers only bring lawsuits for which there is a demonstrable 
personal and cognizable injury or imminent injury. With the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Freedom from Religion Foundation, the purpose 
served by the doctrine is under fire.139 By expanding the doctrine to 
encompass executive actions, taxpayers can bring lawsuits against the 
executive branch based on the potential harm done to others simply 
because they pay taxes. Such a fluid basis for standing has the 
possibility of becoming a method “to air his generalized grievances 
about the conduct of government.”140 The list of potential damages to 
hypothetical people is large. The court has further opened the door by 
not limiting lawsuits to those who have a nexus with the injury 
alleged. 
 
                                                 
135 Id. 
136 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
60-62 (2d ed. 2002). 
137 Freedom from Religion Found., F. 433 F.3d at 1000 (Ripple, J. dissenting). 
138 Id. at 994 (majority opinion). 
139 Id. at 989-1000. 
140 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968). 
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C. Judicial Responsibility 
 
Since Marbury v. Madison, the Judiciary’s responsibility has been 
to interpret the Constitution and draw limitations on power for the 
branches of government, including the judicial branch itself.141 Yet in 
their concurring opinions denying rehearing en banc, both Judges 
Flaum and Easterbrook refused let the entire court review the issues 
concerning judicial self-government created by Freedom from 
Religion Foundation v. Chao.142 The denial of rehearing made Judge 
Posner’s opinion the law of the land, unless the Supreme Court accepts 
certiorari. It is an abdication of its duty for an appellate court to close 
its doors143 to resolve tensions that other circuits have answered 
faithfully without changing Supreme Court precedent.144 In fact, Chief 
Judge Flaum suggested that “the position set forth in the dissent is one 




Taxpayer standing has been prohibited by a line of Supreme Court 
cases with one narrow exception – if it involves a specific 
congressional expenditure of funds that violates the Establishment 
Clause.  In Freedom from Religion Foundation Inc. v. Chao, the 
Seventh Circuit improperly expanded Supreme Court precedent by 
permitting taxpayer standing in situations involving executive actions 
and use of general congressional funds.  At first glance, the Seventh 
Circuit seems to be granting power to the taxpaying public to be a 
check on the executive branch. However, closer analysis of this case 
                                                 
141 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
142 Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 447 F.3d 988-89 (7th 2006). 
143 Flast, 392 U.S. at 111. 
144 See generally D.C. Common Cause v. District of Columbia, 858 F.2d 1, 4 
(D.C. Cir. 1988); In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1028 (2d 
Cir. 1989). 
145 See generally D.C. Common Cause, 858 F.2d at 4; Catholic Conference, 
885 F.2d at 1028. 
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reveals the decision to be a power grab by the Seventh Circuit with 
potentially unaccountable, undemocratic results.  As a result, the 
executive and legislative branches of the government may now be 
subordinate to the judicial branch rather than co-equal. By not 
following Supreme Court precedent narrowly and faithfully, like sister 
courts have done, the Seventh Circuit has also added a cloud of 
confusion over the complex doctrine of taxpayer standing.  
Furthermore, the majority and dissenting opinions agreed that the 
controversy warranted Supreme Court intervention, yet the denial of 
rehearing en banc made the divided three judge panel’s precedent-
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